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Synopsis: 
The law deals with the complexities of humanity and human relationships.  Unique 
questions are brought before the judges who are called upon to find answers that fit 
within an established and potentially inflexible legal framework.  Often the search for 
an answer requires the judges to exercise discretion at the same time as providing an 
outcome which complies with legal principle.   This process often leads to appeals to 
public policy which potentially masks an application of judicial values.  This paper 
draws on three difficult judicial decisions to reveal the values underpinning the 
application of ‘policy’ to the facts before the court.  The research is combined with 
original critical analysis of the language of policy in the difficult cases.  The 
conclusion reached is that the language of policy facilitates personal values and it is 
this process that creates essential flexibility and injects humanity into the hard cases. 
 
Introduction 
The law, as pointed out by Frank over 60 years ago, ‘is not a machine and the judges 
are not machine-tenders.’
1
  It is dealing with ‘human relations in their most 
complicated aspects. The whole confused, shifting helter-skelter of life parades before 
it.’
2
  Judges are often called upon to find answers to questions never posed before, to 
balance a complex array of needs and interests and to ensure that their answers fit 
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within a recognised legal framework.  This is particularly evident in the rapidly 
changing landscape of medical law.  These cases, which are by definition unique both 
in circumstance and potential outcome, give rise to questions where the answer is not 
clearly defined and the law is complex and uncertain. Judges are called upon to 
balance the conflicted rights, interests and duties and find answers where none are 
readily available. In reaching a decision, judges will exercise discretion to achieve an 
outcome which is perceived fair and just.  It is often explicitly recognised that the 
exercise of discretion introduces an element of flexibility which is essential in these 
decisions.  However, with flexibility there is potential for inconsistency and the high 
level of public scrutiny requires that the judge must provide transparent reasons for 
the conclusions that they reach.  Reasons which are expected to be consistent with 
accepted legal principle and may, despite the often fact-driven nature of the dispute, 
be accorded precedential value in subsequent disputes.
3
  
 
In reaching a decision in many of these difficult cases the judge appeals to 
‘public policy’ to provide the foundation for the decision. The assertion of policy 
facilitates discretion and allows the judge to address issues outside the framework of 
legal principle.  Indeed, judicial appeals to policy are, according to Lord Steyn, an 
‘everyday occurrence.’
4
 Yet policy has been described as ‘one of the most under-
analysed terms in the modern legal lexicon.’
5
  It is a term that is poorly articulated in 
the judgments and this becomes even more evident when both majority and dissenting 
judges make appeals to public policy without defining or explaining the relevant 
policy, yet reach opposite conclusions.   
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It is our position that in in cases where the law does not provide a clear 
answer, judicial decision-making is framed by legal principle, but decisions which 
assert public policy are underpinned by individual values. This paper will explore the 
judicial process and assert that the complex interplay of influences warrants 
acknowledgment.  Furthermore, whilst there is a retreat from the language of values, 
the language of policy and the values it represents is an important aspect of the 
application of the law and serves to lend flexibility to the judicial decision-making 
process that would not be possible if judges were limited to strict and formulaic legal 
principle. It follows in cases which require the exercised of judicial discretion, other 
extra-legal factors may influence the decision making process. 
 
There is an increasing interest by social psychologists and behavioral 
economists in the process of decision-making.  The work of Daniel Kahenman and 
Aaron Tversky brought the subconscious psychological influences on decision 
making to public attention.
6
  However, to date there are limited studies on the 
psychological process of judicial decision-making.  Those studies that do exist, 
suggest that despite being expert decision makers, in uncertain decisions judges are 
subject to the same subconscious psychological influences and processes as any other 
educated decision maker.
7
   
 
The recognition of these influences is not confined to abstract or theoretical 
discussion. Indeed, innate influences such as personal values have been shown to play 
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a role in legal decisions.
8
  In this context, the potential influence of subconscious 
factors highlight issues regarding the transparency of judicial decisions.  
 
Indeed, it was the presence of these extra-legal influences, including values, 
that concerned Justice Michael Kirby in Chappel v Hart when he quoted Lord 
Salmon; 
 
“In truth, the conception in question [ie causation] is not susceptible of 
reduction to a satisfactory formula". Similarly, in Alphacell Ltd v Woodward 
Lord Salmon observed that causation is "essentially a practical question of fact 
which can best be answered by ordinary common sense rather than by abstract 
metaphysical theory." Yet, a losing party has a right to know why it has lost 
and should not have its objections brushed aside with a reference to 
"commonsense", at best an uncertain guide involving "subjective, unexpressed 
and undefined extra-legal values" varying from one decision-maker to 
another.’
9
 
 
Justice Hayne, in the same case, suggested that the values underpinning judgments 
should be revealed: 
“The description of the steps involved in that kind of process is difficult and is apt 
to mislead. Articulating the reasoning will sometimes appear to give undue 
emphasis to particular considerations. No doubt if policy and value judgments are 
made, they should be identified.
10
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In this paper we aim to reveal the values that underpin judicial decisions in three 
cases and will argue that the language of public policy is used to frame the decision 
which is based on judicial values. We do not go so far as to suggest that this implicit 
role of values become explicit, we merely seek to explore and understand the role that 
they may play.  
 
Personal Values and Judicial Decisions 
Values  and value judgements within legal scholarship encompasses a wide range of 
different concepts from morals, interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, 
desires, wants, goals, needs, attractions and other kinds of selective orientations.  
This paper is grounded in psychological understandings of values and as such defines 
values within a psychological context.  Values are defined by Milton Rokeach, as; 
 “enduring beliefs that a specific mode of conduct is personally or 
socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct.”
11 
 
Personal values are developed through human experience and act as a largely 
subconscious guide to decision making.
 12
   They underpin the decision making 
process and guide a decision-maker.  However, it may not be a binary choice as an 
individual may hold a wide range of values in high regard.  It is the relative 
importance of the specific values in relation to each other that varies between 
individuals and this is the relationship that is critical to decision-making, as opposed 
to the importance of a single value alone.  Drawing on a model of personal values 
developed by Schwartz, a content analysis method was developed to identify values 
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within legal judgments.
13
 The study revealed different personal values in judicial 
opinions endorsing opposing positions in cases which divided the UK Supreme Court. 
This finding was supported by experimental evidence demonstrating a close link 
between personal values and legal decision making.  
 
This paper draws on the techniques developed in the earlier work to examine 
the relationship between values and judicial reasoning centered on policy. We have 
chosen to focus on three key cases at the interface of personal autonomy and medical 
practice, within the reasoning of each case, the judges draw on policy as significant to 
the decision reached. This discussion will highlight the values which underpin the 
‘policy’ decisions  and demonstrate that judicial language may be consistent, but the 
personal drivers behind those decisions is as individual as the judges themselves. 
 
A brief introduction to the Schwartz model of values 
There are many models of values within legal and psychological literature.
14
  This 
paper draws on the model developed Shalom Schwartz which has been extensively 
used and unlike many models of values, demonstrates how an individual’s values 
relate to each other.
15
  This model of personal values is based on highly conserved, 
trans-cultural values and has been used extensively in psychological research and 
validated world-wide.
16
  The Schwartz model argues that all conserved personal 
values can be encompassed in ten overarching motivations; stimulation (excitement), 
self-direction (including independence and freedom), universalism (including social 
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justice and equality), benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, 
achievement, hedonism (personal pleasure).  An individual can regard each value as 
important, however when a decision is to be reached between conflicting values, the 
decision-maker will support one value above another. For example, if the discussion 
of detention orders was framed as a value decision, in deciding to support detention 
orders, the decision-maker can be viewed as affirming values encompassed in security 
(national security) over those encompassed in independence (freedom and liberty).  
 
Values are broadly classified into two opposing dimensions.  Conservative 
values emphasising order, preservation of the past, and resistance to change 
(including values encompassed within tradition, conformity and security)  which are 
opposed to the values affirming openness to change and independence of thought, 
action and readiness for change (such as self-direction).  The second are those values 
that promote self-enhancement (achievement, power) and those embodied in concepts 
of self-transcendence, or subverting self-interests for the welfare and interests of 
others (universalism, benevolence). 
17
  
 
Turning specifically to judicial opinions, this value framework has been used 
to develop a method of systematic content analysis.   Although empirical content 
analysis is not commonly used, it has been used to identify characteristics of judicial 
reasoning in tort law cases
18
, including contributing to the understanding of policy.
19
  
The content analysis is the systematic rule-guided technique to analyse textual data 
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and provides an unobtrusive, replicable method to provide insight into complex text.  
The content analysis coding framework used in this analysis associated judicial 
statements with the values that the statements affirm.
20
 For example; Justice Hayne in 
Chappel v Hart   
“The law of negligence is intended to compensate those who are injured as a 
result of departures from standards of reasonable care. It is not intended to 
compensate those who have received reasonable care but who may not have 
had the best available care.”
21
 
In this statement Justice Hayne highlights the importance of limiting the 
application of the law of negligence.  This statement presents an affirmation of social 
order which asserts the need to limit the obligations of the State and individuals.  This 
value is encompassed within Security which centers on the stability of society.  
Therefore this statement represents an affirmation of the values encompassed within 
security. 
 
In the same case Kirby J affirmed the importance of autonomy in the context 
of the legal duty to inform a patient of risks inherent in proposed medical treatment; 
‘This is the duty which all health care professionals in the position of Dr 
Chappel must observe: the duty of informing patients about risks, answering 
their questions candidly and respecting their rights, including (where they so 
choose) to postpone medical procedures and to go elsewhere for treatment.’
22
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The value of autonomy is encompassed within self-direction values that 
promote independent thought and action and includes autonomy.   Therefore in 
affirming autonomy, Justice Kirby is affirming the values associated with self-
direction. 
 
Universalism is a broad value defined as understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and 
protection for the welfare of all people.  It encompasses values which emphasise the 
subordination of self for society as a whole.  In a legal context, this value affirms 
social justice and the protection of the vulnerable; 
‘It would, in the circumstances of the case, be unjust to absolve the 
medical practitioner from legal responsibility…..’
23
 
‘It will have lost its ability to protect the patient and thus to fulfil the only 
purpose which brought it into existence.’
24
 
 
Tradition and conformity values share the same goal of subordinating the self to 
socially imposed expectations.   Tradition and conformity in legal opinions emphasise 
restraint and adherence to precedent and the affirmation of Parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The systematic content analysis of judgments reveals the values affirmed 
within the judgments and facilitates the comparison of judgments.  
 
Selection of Cases 
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This model of values is used to analyse difficult cases which assert policy as 
central to the reasoning.   In doing so, it is possible to examine the association 
between the language of policy and values. Three cases were selected for analysis. All 
draw heavily on policy in the reasoning and focus on the same difficult legal question 
of ‘loss of a chance’. Two of the decisions divided judicial opinion on the issues 
surrounding a doctor’s duty to warn patients of the risks inherent in proffered medical 
treatment. Chappel v Hart [1998] was heard in the Australian High Court and the 
subsequent case of Chester v Afshar [2004], in the UK Court of Appeal, considered 
the decision in Chappel v Hart.  The third decision, Tabet v Gett, re-visited the 
question of the loss of a chance in the context of provision of medical treatment and 
rejected ‘loss of a chance’ as having a role in the law of negligence.  
 
We will argue that in these cases where the outcome is uncertain, the concept 
of policy is introduced as a tool for the exercise of judicial discretion.  In exercising 
discretion, the judge is reaching a decision between two equally valid arguments and 
this decision is underpinned by personal values, which act as a subconscious influence 
on judicial decision-making. 
 
Methodology 
 
Systematic value content analysis was carried out in Nvivo on each of the judgments 
in the selected cases.
25
 The analysis through Nvivo facilitated the quantification of 
value statements both within individual judgments and combined judgments which 
allowed comparisons between individual judges and between those supporting 
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opposing positions.  The data is presented in graphic form, with the number of value 
statements expressed as a percentage of the total values in the judgment(s) or case. 
 
Results. 
 
The decision in Chappel v Hart (1998) centred on a surgeon’s negligent failure to 
warn, loss of a chance and causation.  Mrs Hart underwent necessary surgery but was 
not warned of the heightened risk of infection if her oesophagus was perforated. Her 
condition was progressive and there was no question that she would have undertaken 
the surgery at some time.  The risk of perforation and infection would have been 
present whenever Mrs Hart had the surgery and irrespective of who treated her.  The 
claim therefore focused on her assertion that she would have delayed the surgery and 
sought the most experience surgeon to perform it. Thus, she argued that she had lost 
the chance to have the surgery performed at another time, by another surgeon.  The 
case divided the court 3-2 with five separate opinions. Justices Gaudron, Gummow 
and Kirby in the majority upheld the original damage award and identified a causal 
connection between the failure to warn and the claimant’s injury. Justices McHugh 
and Hayne dissented and suggested that the plaintiff would be exposed to the class of 
risk regardless of the omission.     
 
The majority and dissenting opinions drew on both legal principle and policy 
to support their positions.  For example Gaudron J highlighted the duty to inform as a 
legal principle;  
’Because the risk was a risk of physical injury, the duty was to inform 
her of that risk. And that particular duty was imposed because, in 
 12 
point of legal principle, it was sufficient, in the ordinary course of 
events, to avert the risk of physical injury which called it into 
existence.’
26
 
 
‘In this way the submissions for Dr Chappel tended to divert attention from 
the central issue, namely whether there was adequate reason in logic or policy 
for refusing to regard the ‘but for’ test as the cause of the injuries sustained by 
Mrs Hart, by the allurement of further cogitation upon the subject of ‘loss of a 
chance.’
27
   
 
The dissenting opinions also used the language of policy and principle. 
McHugh J acknowledged the role of policy in the decision reached  
‘As a natural consequence of the rejection of the ‘but for’ test as the sole 
determinant of causation, the Court has refused to regard the concept of 
remoteness of damage as the appropriate mechanism for determining the 
extent to which policy considerations should limit the consequences of 
causation-in-fact.’  
28
  
And later in his judgment appeals specifically to principles of law: 
‘No principle of the law of contract or tort or of risk allocation 
requires the defendant to be liable for those risks of an activity or 
course of conduct that cannot be avoided or reduced by the exercise of 
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reasonable care unless statute, contract or a duty otherwise imposed 
by law has made the defendant responsible for those risks.’
29
 
Thus the language was similar in both majority and minority opinions, 
with both drawing on policy and legal principle to support their reasoning.   
Both the majority and minority recognise the importance of values in 
their decisions making an association between policy and values in legal 
decisions surrounding issues of causation;  
‘However, the ‘but for’ test is not a comprehensive and exclusive 
criterion, and the results which are yielded by its application properly 
may be tempered by the making of value judgments and the infusion 
of policy considerations.’
30
 
Indeed, McHugh J supporting the minority position also asserts an association 
between values and policy considerations,  
 
 ‘Consequently, value judgments and policy as well as our ‘experience 
of the 'constant conjunction' or 'regular sequence' of pairs of events in 
nature’ are regarded as central to the common law's conception of 
causation.’
31
 
 Therefore the judges themselves specifically identify the role of values but 
package them in the language of policy which implies consistent sets of values and 
application of those values.  We see that the judgments, despite reaching opposing 
                                                     
29
 Chappel v Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, McHugh J at  [28]. 
30
 Chappel v Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, Gummow J, at [62]. 
31
 Chappel v Hart  (1998) 195 CLR 232, McHugh J, at [24]. 
 14 
decisions, draw on both policy and legal principles to support their positions and in 
the process,  highlight the link between policy and values.  The question to ask then 
is, ‘do the opposing judgments reflect opposing values?’ Empirical analysis of the 
judgments revealed a differential pattern of expression of the values in the judgments 
of the majority in comparison to those supporting the minority position.  
 
Figure 1:  Value content analysis of the judgments supporting opposing 
positions in Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232. 
The values espoused by the majority are represented in the dark bars and 
expressed as percentage of the overall number of value statements in the 
opinions of the majority.  The values of the minority expressed as a percentage 
are represented in the light bars.   
 
 Value content analysis revealed different value profiles for judgments written 
in support of the majority and those in support of the dissenting position.  73% of 
coded value statements in the majority opinions represented values encompassed 
within self-direction in the form of autonomy and judicial freedom and universalism 
which encompassed the principles of social justice and protection of the vulnerable.  
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Although there was some coding of values encompassed within tradition and 
conformity these only represented 1/5 of the total coding. 
 
 In contrast, the judgments written supporting the minority position recognised 
the values encompassed in universalism and self-direction, but in contrast to the 
majority judgments more than half the coding reflected the opposing values 
encompassed within conformity including preventing uncertainty in the law and 
conforming with rules, and security.      
 
  The empirical analysis suggests that the majority decision reflected values 
encompassed in self-direction and universalism, in contrast the minority espoused 
values encompassed within conformity and security.  Indeed, this conflict in values 
was emphasised by Justice Kirby when he highlighted the tension between 
conforming to legal principles (conformity) and fairness (universalism);  
‘Where a breach of duty and loss are proved, it is natural enough for a court to 
feel reluctant to send the person harmed (in this case a patient) away empty 
handed. However, such reluctance must be overcome where legal principle 
requires it. It must be so not only out of fairness to the defendant but also 
because, otherwise, a false standard of liability will be fixed which may have 
undesirable professional and social consequences.’
32
 
Interestingly, Justice Kirby was the most neutral in his value position, espousing 
values encompassed within both universalism and conformity (preventing uncertainty 
in the law) representing 37% of his coding.  This may reflect an element of indecision 
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between the two positions and the values they represent. It appears that Justice Kirby 
cast the deciding vote which may have been reflected in his reasoning; 
‘It is further illustrated by the division of opinions in this case: 
Gaudron J and Gummow J favouring the dismissal of the appeal; 
McHugh J and Hayne J being in favour of allowing it. I agree with the 
remarks of my colleagues that the case is a difficult one involving an 
unusual chain of events.’
33
 
 
In this decision therefore we see the Judges recognising the potential influence 
of values mediated through policy, on the decision reached. Value analysis of the 
collective judgments reveals a tension between the values of the majority and 
minority and this tension is also evident in the individual judgments.  Indeed, the 
analysis of values, reveals the internal tensions between opposing values, although the 
final outcome is framed in the language of neutrality and policy, the analysis reveals 
the intrinsic values that underpins the outcome. 
 
 
 A similar pattern of differential value expression was evident in the House of 
Lords case Chester v Afshar.  This later case drew upon the reasoning in Chappel v 
Hart to decide whether a doctor’s failure to fully inform a patient of risks was 
sufficient to satisfy causation.  This case also divided judicial opinion, with Lords 
Walker, Hope and Steyn endorsing the majority position and Lord Bingham and Lord 
Hoffman dissenting.    
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Again, the reasoning highlighted a conflict between opposing values.   
 
 
Figure 3:  Value content analysis of the opposing judgments in Chester v 
Afshar [2005] 1 AC 134 
The values espoused by the majority are represented in the dark bars and 
expressed as percentage of the overall number of value statements in the 
opinions of the majority.  The values of the minority expressed as a percentage 
are represented in the light bars.   
 
 As with the judgments in Chappel v Hart, the majority espoused values 
encompassed within self-direction (autonomy) and universalism (social justice, 
equality and protection of the vulnerable). Although there were very few values 
expressed in the dissenting opinions, the values expressed were the opposing values 
encompassed in conservation, including conformity, security and tradition. Lord 
Steyn highlighted the conflict between opposing values of  self-direction and tradition  
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‘But they [facets of autonomy] must also be weighed again the undesirability 
of departing from established principles of causation, except for good reasons.  
The collision of competing ideas poses a difficult question of law.’
34
 
In his judgment, Lord Steyn also highlighted the conflict between the values of 
tradition and universalism, drawing on academic opinion to promote universalism to 
affirm a link with policy, by paraphrasing the work of Prof. Honore suggesting that 
 
‘He was also right to say that policy and corrective justice pull powerfully in 
favour of vindicating the patient’s right to know.’
35
 
 
 The empirical analysis of these decisions suggests that despite the similar 
language of policy the judicial approaches to the complex issues raised by the 
claimants are underpinned by different values which may influence the decision 
reached.   In both Chappel v Hart and Chester v Afshar, the majority reached a 
decision supporting individual autonomy, espousing the values encompassed in both 
self-direction and universalism. In contrast, the dissenting opinions espoused values 
included in conservation including tradition, conformity and security.   
 
Statements which reflect values are more frequently espoused in cases which divide 
judicial opinion, and this is true in Chester v Afshar and Chappel v Hart.  However, 
values are not limited to decisions that divide opinion,  they may play a role in 
decisions where the Bench is in accord and indicate situations where the application 
of an established legal test does not immediately present an answer meaning that 
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broader considerations such as ‘policy’ are invoked. Such a situation is demonstrated 
by the third case in our discussion: Tabet v Gett  (2010).  
 
The central issue from both Chester v Afshar and Chappel v Hart was loss of a 
chance and causation, this question was re-visited by the Australian High Court in 
Tabet v Gett
36
  where the  court considered whether recovery for loss of chance was 
available in personal injury cases.  The High Court held that recovery for loss of a 
chance was not available, highlighting that if it was available the balance in these 
kinds of cases may tip in favour of the plaintiffs, resulting in a significant impact on 
professional liability insurance and consequentially the healthcare system.  The 
significance of this decision was reflected in the number of individual judgments, 
Gummow ACJ, Heydon, Crennan and Keifel  JJ all chose to deliver an individual 
judgment, with only  Hayne and Bell  JJ writing a jointly. The graph below presents 
the values espoused in those judgments; 
 
Figure 3.  Value content analysis of the consensus opinions (judgments) in 
Tabet v Gett (2010) 240 CLR 537. 
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Individual values are expressed as a percentage of the total values expressed in 
the judgments. 
 
 Typically, cases in which a consensus decision is reached, do not have many 
opinions written by individual judges and do not have many statements which reflect 
values.  However, although reaching a consensus decision, five opinions were 
delivered in Tabet v Gett encompassing 18 coded statements.   The decision centred 
on the values encompassed in conformity with ‘preventing uncertainty in the law’ 
which represented 83% of the total coding.  Indeed, despite different reasoning, the 
majority of the value coding of each of four of the judgments (Justices Heydon, 
Keifel, Hayne, Bell and Gummow ACJ) was coded in conformity representing 
between 64% (Gummow ACJ) to 100% (Keifel J) of the coding.
37
  Only Gummow 
ACJ espoused a need for flexibility in the law which is encompassed within 
universalism but the expression of this value was significantly less than the values 
encompassed in overarching motivation of conservation (conformity, tradition and 
security). 
 
Discussion 
There is increasing evidence that values may play a role in hard cases “those cases in 
which the result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent”. 
38
  In such uncertain 
cases, values influence the judicial reasoning and decisions through the exercise of 
discretion.  The question that flows from this is whether this appeal to values is 
clearly set out in the judicial narrative or is there a linguistic veil thrown over the 
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reasoning?  We argue that instead of openly acknowledging value-based 
considerations the judiciary will instead cloak their discussion in appeals to ‘public 
policy’. This is a broad and somewhat uncertain term that fails to lend clarity to the 
discussion and warrants careful consideration. However, values, even cloaked as 
policy,   may provide a critical role in such cases to open the door to the exercise of 
judicial discretion.  
 
As we have seen in the preceding discussion,  judges will sometimes refer to 
the underlying values but are more likely to appeal to ‘policy’ or ‘public policy’, 
terms that defy clear and specific definition.  It is a fluid concept which is, at times, 
employed by the judiciary to meet a perceived need, and that is to place the exercise 
of value judgments within an acceptable framework.  
 
In the context of the complex medical decisions we are discussing, there has 
been a consistent pattern of placing emphasis on the social utility of treatment and in 
2005, in Chester v Afshar (Chester)
39
 the House of Lords clearly, and emphatically, 
addressed policy considerations such as social utility and questions of whether a 
plaintiff ‘ought’ to recover at the expense of established causative principles.  
Tracking this language through some earlier decisions we can see that ‘policy’ has 
played an overt role, but as illustrated above, values sit at the base of these ‘policy’ 
discussions.  Indeed, it is argued that values underpin these policy decisions. In the 
foundational decision of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam)
40
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policy was described as a relevant consideration
41
 and again in Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlehem Royal Hospital & the Maudsley Hospital & Ors 
(Sidaway)
42
 the need to focus on broader interests than those represented by one 
patient were emphasised, along with the policy demand to avoid the practice of 
defensive medicine which would potentially cripple medical advancement.
43
 These 
decisions were considering the duty to warn of risks inherent in medical treatment.  
The conclusions reflected a policy decision that to impose an onerous duty to warn 
would create an overly cautious medical professional, unwilling to advance or try out 
new treatment. Bolitho v City Hackney Health Authority (Bolitho)
44
 completed this 
triumvirate of cases and acted to reinforce the doctor-centric policy base of earlier 
decisions, thus preparing the ground for the emphatically policy driven decision of 
Chester. 
 
The difficult decision of Chester saw the House of Lords openly embracing 
policy as a driving consideration in decisions such as these. The problem with this 
approach is that whilst the Lords all referred to and relied upon policy, it was not 
always the same ‘policy’. In the view of Lord Bingham, the appropriate policy 
consideration was the underlying purpose of negligence law as a whole,
45
 whilst the 
majority looked to the underlying ethos of the duty to warn of the risks inherent in 
medical treatment. And, in still a different approach again, Lord Steyn struggled to fit 
the enquiry into the existing negligence framework and application of the ‘but for 
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test.’ This resulted in an unconvincing conclusion based on the reduced likelihood of 
a small risk materialising if the operation was delayed.
46
  The poorly articulated 
reference to policy considerations was in reality reflecting the significant role of 
values as outlined above.  
 
In the Australian decisions, policy considerations have not been as openly 
embraced, but nevertheless they sit behind much of the judicial reasoning in the more 
difficult decisions under consideration here. Whilst the High Court has readily 
acknowledged that ‘value judgments’ and ‘considerations of policy’ enter into 
‘intangible question of responsibility’ in the negligence enquiry,
47
 it has carefully 
avoided openly embracing policy based decisions. There is a consistent endeavour to 
place the negligence discussion within a setting of principle but the Court often 
returns to the significance of broader ‘normative considerations,’ such as ‘values or 
policy’
48
 acknowledging that the issues under consideration in this context do not 
always sit comfortably within the existing framework.   We see therefore that at 
times, the role of values is expressly acknowledged but it is always with some 
reluctance and care is taken to place any statement of values firmly within the 
framework of principle.  
 
In Chappel v Hart
49
 the High Court studiously avoided the language of policy, 
opting instead for the ‘common sense’ test developed in March v Stramare,
50
 and so 
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aimed for a principled approach to the law. The ‘common sense’ test however, 
necessarily involves the introduction of value judgments and this is reflected in the 
analysis of the judgment represented in Figure 1. When the concept of common sense 
is scrutinised, it is clear that the term requires individual, and often idiosyncratic, 
interpretations of what constitutes both common and sense. Thus whilst policy as a 
term is not employed, the underlying process is driven by similar considerations as 
those found in the decisions from the United Kingdom which specifically refer to 
policy considerations.  These policy considerations range from views of the purpose 
of negligence law as a whole through to individual interpretations of what is just and 
right in the circumstances. Underpinning all of this is the values framework. 
 
If we consider some later decisions there is a more overt acknowledgment of 
the role of individual values as expressed in ‘policy’ considerations and an indication 
that something more than a strict application of principle can drive judicial decision-
making processes. This was acknowledged in Elbourne v Gibbs
51
 when, following an 
analysis of post Chappel decisions, Basten JA emphasised that establishing the 
principles of causation in tort law must ‘satisfy the policy underlying the legal 
attribution of responsibility.’
52
 Similarly in Dr Ibrahim v Arkell
53
 Fitzgerald JA noted 
that these
54
 decisions are driven by the ‘policy requirement entitling a competent 
person to make his or her own decision about his or her life.’
55
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Thus we have the broad notion of a policy which serves to preserve the rigour 
of the law alongside a narrower, individual needs-based policy aimed at preserving 
the personal integrity of the plaintiff-patient.  This opens the question of what is the 
dominant ‘policy’ consideration, how is it formed and how can potentially conflicting 
‘policies’ be reconciled?  It is the inability to answer this question with any certainty 
that lies at the heart of our argument that these decisions are not driven by objective, 
externally driven concerns.  Rather, underpinning the judicial rationale is an internal 
set of values that are given expression in the language of policy.   
 
The role of ‘policy’ is therefore to lend some flexibility to the judicial 
decision-making process.  The problem with the term is that it is employed by the 
judges to appeal to some apparently external measure that can be used as a measure of 
the decision reached.  However there is no consistency or clarity around the term and 
as we have seen, ‘policy’ can ‘dictate’ opposing conclusions.   Thus policy is exposed 
as a flexible term that is best viewed as the means by which judges are able to address 
the complexities presented by the ‘the whole confused, shifting helter-skelter of life 
parades before [them].’ 
56
 In short, the very nature of the issues that come before the 
Courts call for a willingness to be flexible and to perhaps apply a clear mix of 
established legal tests and the more loosely defined considerations collectively 
labelled policy. This is a process we have seen applied with a liberal hand in the 
decisions outlined above. 
 
To have an inflexible court would result in injustice and a denial of the very 
nature of humanity and human problems which seek resolution through the 
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application of the law.  However, the need for flexibility must be balanced against the 
need for coherent law and whilst basing judicial conclusions upon individual 
statements of ‘broad values … [may well be] beguiling’
57
 it is ‘misleading 
simplicity’
58
 and unlikely to result in the development of coherent law. 
  
Seeking coherence 
 
The issue we are raising here is the potential for a lack of coherence and transparency. 
The judges employ the term policy, in the words of McHugh and Gummow JJ, ‘glide 
to a conclusion,’
59
 based upon individually-formed assumptions of what is appropriate 
in the circumstances. This occurs when the chaos of human relations collides with 
apparently rigid legal principles. It is our view, policy may serve to mask the true 
nature of judicial reasoning.  
 
Whilst it is easy to refer simply to the notion of ‘policy,’ it is difficult to give 
it specific content. As pointed out by Bennion, ‘the content of public policy (and 
therefore legal policy) is what the Court thinks and says it is.’
60
 In the absence of clear 
(and consistent) content, how can reasoning based upon policy provide clarity or 
certainty in the law? To appeal to policy is potentially to appeal to uncertain and 
individual notions of what is a fair result in the specific circumstances before the 
Court, such an appeal represents a departure from ‘the path of merely logical 
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deduction … [and we] lose the illusion of certainty.’
61
 It is from certainty and 
consistency that confidence in the law grows. 
 
It is important to recognise that a call for certainty does not connote a call for 
a concrete or inflexible law. Indeed the law must, as argued above, remain inherently 
flexible as it is not (and ought not be) a machine.
62
 Flexibility however, does not 
necessarily lead to incoherent or opaque (as opposed to transparent) law. Rather it 
means a system that is able to shift and change as needs and expectations of society 
shift and change.   
 
 The law must evolve and change, and this evolution and change must also be 
acknowledged. To appeal to ‘policy’ as though it were a concrete and fixed notion is 
to deny the nature of the law and to conceal the true nature of the reasoning process 
underlying the decision. The problem here is lies in the absence of clearly stated 
reasoning.  As explained by Kirby J in Cattanach v Melchior
63
 ‘if the application of 
ordinary legal principles is to be denied on the basis of public policy, it is essential 
that such policy be spelt out so as to be susceptible of analysis and criticism.’
64
  
Flexibility of the law is not something to hide; it is important that we acknowledge 
that the process of judicial decision-making is more than a mechanical application of 
rules.
65
 Despite the uncertainty associated with the language of policy, there are some 
clear advantages associated with the value based decisions which policy enables. 
Frank takes this argument further and argues that we ought openly to acknowledge the 
                                                     
61
 Wendell Holmes Jr, (1894-1895) p 7. 
62
 Frank  (1949). 
63
 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1. 
64
 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1,at  [152] (Kirby J). 
65
 Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 CLR 1, at [121]. 
 28 
flexibility, embrace the ‘unavoidably human, fallible character of the law,’ and if we 
do this, then perhaps the ‘retreat into policy,’ may not be necessary.
66
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